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RECKONING FOR LEGAL SERVICES:
A CASE STUDY OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN INDIAN EDUCATION*
Michael Paul Gross**
Qui Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?
I. Introduction
In 1966, as part of the War on Poverty, the Office of Economic Op-
portunity (OEO) dispatched hundreds of young lawyers to ghettos, Appalachian
hollows, and Indian reservations "not simply to get poor people out of a specific
jam," according to R. Sargent Shriver, OEO's first director, "but to get them out
of poverty once and for all."1
Seven years later a reckoning for these lawyers is at hand. Congress is
presently considering H. R. 7824, a bill providing for a legal services corporation
to oversee the 2,500 lawyers in 900 separate projects around the country.2 But
along with the question whether there will be a program is the equally important
one of what kind of program it will be.
Although the issue shaping up in Congress relates to political controls over
the program, its resolution will not entirely settle the question of what kind of
program emerges. This is because throughout most of its existence, OEO legal
services programs have been enveloped in political imbroglios which have
rendered discussion of legal assistance to the poor ideological. The result has
been a rhetorical war. Vice-President Agnew, a leading critic, writing in the
September, 1972, issue of the American Bar Association Journal, calls legal
services "a federally funded system manned by ideological vigilantes" who are
engaged in "a systematic effort to redistribute societal advantages and disad-
vantages, penalties and rewards, rights and resources."'3 Governor Ronald
Reagan joins in by calling poverty lawyers "ideological ambulance chasers."4
The program's supporters, mostly members of the Bar, have responded in
kind. In January, 1971, The Washington Monthly stated that "the work of the
poverty lawyers has been a rare, multi-faceted success in the war on poverty."5
The ACLU's newspaper, Civil Liberties, calls the OEO legal program "one of
* Since receiving this article for publication, significant differing viewpoints concerning
the merits of the programs discussed have come to our attention. We present this article to
promote discussion of the issues raised by this disagreement. The views expressed do not neces-
sarily represent the views of the Editors or the Notre Dame Law School. For further informa-
tion concerning opposing views, contact the Notre Dame Lawyer; Box 486; Notre Dame,
Indiana 46556.
** B.A., Brown University; L.L.B., Yale, 1968. Coordinator for Ramah Navajo School
Board, 1970. Currently in private practice serving Indian community school boards and the
Coalition of Indian Controlled School Boards, Inc.; formerly employed as staff attorney in Law
Reform Unit of DNA Legal Services, Window Rock, Arizona, and as consulting attorney to
the Native American Rights Fund, Boulder, Colorado.
1 Shriver, The OEO and Legal Services, 51 A.B.A.J. 1064 (1965).
2 TRB, Robin Hood in Reverse, THE NEW REPUBIC, Mar. 3, 1973, at 4; 18 AMERICAN
BAR NEWS, No. 7, Jul. 1973, at 1.
3 Agnew, What's Wrong with the Legal Services Program? 58 A.B.A.J. 930, 931 (1972).
4 TRB, supra note 2.
5 T. Branch, The Ordeal of Legal Services: How Poor People Won in Court But Lost in
OEO, THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Jan., 1971, at 5.
78
LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN INDIAN EDUCATION
the few truly effective programs ever organized to procure equal justice."' The
Chairman of the ABA's Standing Committee on Legal Aid, William R. Klaus,
calls it "an innovative, courageous and historic experiment in social justice."7
Even The New York Times editorializes it as "the most innovative of O.E.O.
programs. 8
Common to all of these comments, those of both the left and the right, is
the universal absence of the views of the poor. Thus if legal services are to
receive a full, fair and constructive hearing-if the program is to emerge not
only intact but strengthened in its ability to help the poor-then the debate must
change. Hard facts must replace invective.
Above all, Congress and the new legal services corporation (if any is
effected) must listen to the poor, who have been largely voiceless in the past.
After all, by their continued presence the poor symbolize the failure, at least on
a statistical level, of the entire war on poverty. William Greider and Nick Kotz
of The Washington Post report, for example (quoting a former census official),
that "if the index (of poverty) accurately reflected rising costs of living, it would
show around 40 million people below the line of bare subsistence-unchanged
from a decade ago."' But statistics provide only one dimension. Equally im-
portant are the mental state and spirit of the poor-what Edgar S. and Jean
Camper Cahn, two theoreticians of the poverty war, have described as "the
mentality of despair, apathy, passivity and the vulnerability to exploitation,
harassment and manipulation."" ° On this psychological front the record of
OEO may not be so bleak. At any rate, no assessment can be made without
listening to the poor speaking for themselves from what the Cahns called "the
civilian perspective," a phrase recalling the military rhetoric popular in the early
days of the war on poverty.'1
I cannot speak for the poor. But I can perhaps offer the beginnings of a
case study of how OEO legal programs have dealt with one unheralded, though
important, area of poverty law-Indian education. Perhaps by examining this
one field, some directions for an overall inquiry can be detected. 2 I suspect that
this inquiry will necessarily focus on the nature and quality of the attorney-
client relationship as they exist in these programs and on their interrelationship
with program structures. This conclusion is drawn from the observation that,
while sometimes performing badly needed functions in individual cases, organized
legal services, especially those administering an "Indian Education Legal Sup-
6 A. Schardt, Waghington Report: Saving Legal Services, CIVL LIBERTIES, May, 1973,
at 3.
7 Klaus, Legal Services Program: Reply to Vice President Agnew, 58 A.B.A.J., 1178
(1972).
8 Editorial, The New York Times, Apr. 6, 1973 at 40.
9 Greider & Kotz, A Passion for Equality, The Washington Post, Apr. 9, 1973, at A14.
10 Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE LJ. 1317, 1322
(1964).
11 Id. at 1321.
12 Of course reasoning from the specific case of Indian education to all of poverty law
would be erroneous. But my aim is not to be scientific or conclusive; it is simply to record
some personal observations and experiences in hopes of jogging discussion of legal services from
the ideological level ("can't we all agree that elimination of poverty in this country ought to
be a priority?") to the question of what the program is really doing. In this sense Indian educa-




port Project" funded by OEO, have failed to respond adequately to the crucial
need in the field: increased participation in and control over school programs
by Indians. Because of their structures, techniques and philosophies-all rooted
in the American eleemosynary tradition-these programs have generally rein-
forced the basic flaw in the system for educating Indians: dependence on whites.
As with other charities, poverty law programs in Indian education and elsewhere
share a common element-almost none are run by their beneficiaries. The
lawyers remain their own bosses. And thus, in the first instance, they have failed
to alter their own relationships with the poor.
Due to the manner in which these programs are controlled, they have been
able to do "good" only by way of charity. This aid has suffered from a psycholo-
gical infirmity common to many interracial, interclass, intercultural gifts: the
infirmity inherent when masters do something for slaves. Social reform cannot
succeed in that fashion: "Historically, the Negro steeped in the inessentiality
of servitude was set free by his master. He did not first gain his freedom,"
wrote Frantz Fanon.5
"One day a good white master who had influence said to his friends, 'let's
be nice to the niggers. . . .' The other masters argued, for after all it was not
an easy thing, but then they decided to promote the machine-men to the supreme
rank of men.
"The upheaval reached the Negroes from without. The black man was
acted upon. Values that had not been created by his actions, values that had
not been born of the systaltic tide of his blood, danced in a whirl around him.
The upheaval did not make a difference in the Negro. He went from one way
of life to another, but not from one life to another."' 4
As long as legal services programs and lawyers, however well intentioned,
continue to exercise initiative over the lives and interests of Indians (and others),
they will remain basically unproductive.
II. Indian Education-Control of Schools
A. The General Pattern
In Indian education the failure of legal services programs and lawyers is
suggested by one telling statistic: the woefully small number of schools con-
trolled by Indians. In 1966 a Navajo community at Rough Rock, deep inside
the vast Navajo Reservation in Arizona, became the first Indian community in
modem times to run its own school."5 Three years later it had not a single
successor. But in that same year, a Special Senate Subcommittee on Indian
Education, after exhaustive investigation, recommended "that similar demon-
stration schools be established and appropriately funded on other Indian reserva-
13 F. FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS 219 (1967).
14 Id.
15 The Bureau of Indian Affairs and OEO jointly funded the program as a "demonstra-
tion" of the capacity of an Indian community to run its own school and of the value of instruct-
ing Navajo students in a Navajo environment with a Navajo-oriented curriculum. See generally,
INDIAN EDUCATION: A NATIONAL TRAGEDY - A NATIONAL CHALLENGE, S. Rep. No. 501, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Rept.].
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tions." 1' It also recommended that "Indian parental and community involve-
ment be increased" in all schools for Indians.' It came to this conclusion
after certifying Indian education as a national tragedy. 8
Both the Special Senate Subcommittee on Indian Education (whose chair-
men have included Senators Robert Kennedy, Wayne Morse, and Edward
Kennedy) and the President agreed on the extent of the failures:
Dropout rates are twice the national average in both public and Federal
schools. Some school districts have dropout rates approaching 100 percent.
Achievement levels of Indian children are two to three years below those of
white students; and the Indian child falls progressively further behind the
longer he stays in school.
Only one percent of Indian children in elementary school have Indian
teachers or principals.
One-fourth of elementary and secondary school teachers-by their own
admission [Subcommittee's emphasis]-would prefer not to teach Indian
children; and Indian children, more than any other minority group, believe
themselves to be "below average" in intelligence.' 9
The Subcommittee pinpointed the single factor chiefly responsible for this mas-
sive tragedy: "The Indian is despised, exploited, and discriminated against...
but always held in check by the white power structure so that his situation will
not change."2 Agreeing with these revelations, the President in 1970 adopted
a new policy for Indian education:
Consistent with our policy that the Indian community should have a right
to take over the control and operation of federally funded programs, we
believe every Indian community wishing to do so should be able to control
its own Indian schools.21
Yet four years after the Subcommittee's Report, three years after the Nixon
Message, and two years after OEO funded a $250,000, two-year Indian Educa-
tion Legal Support project, 22 the number of Indian-run schools remains minus-
cule. Today only about 12 schools are recognized by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs as Indian-controlled (although there are several more community proj-
ects in scattered locations struggling to run alternative schools for Indians, and
some previously white-controlled school districts are now operated under boards
with Indian majorities) .2' Total enrollment in Indian-controlled schools is
16 Id. at 129.
17 Id. at 119.
18 Id. at x.
19 Id. at ix.
20 Id. at 24.
21 116 CONG. Rc. 23131, 23133 (1970) (President Richard M. Nixon's Message to
Congress).
22 The program has been refunded for an interim period extending to October 31, 1973.
(Interview with Nancy Pettis, OEO Program Analyst, Aug. 6, 1973.) When funded in 1971
the project was based on the legal services model, although it was not technically a Legal
Services Branch program. Instead the funds came from OEO's Office of Program Development
(OPD). As explained by the OEO program analyst in charge of the grant at the time, the
grant was channeled in this manner to avoid submitting it to possible veto by the governors of
the states in which the project was to operate. Such submission was a requirement for legal
services grants but not for "research projects" funded through universities.




estimated at only 1.25 percent of all Indian students.' The BIA's own budget
provides ouly $4.5 million for so-called Indian Contract Schools, compared with
$180 million for the rest of the BIA's education program.25
Much of the blame for this tardiness rests of course with the Government's
bureaucracy, not overly anxious to turn itself over to Indians. But it remains
undeniable that a more vigorous effort by OEG programs through the Indian
Education Legal Support Project and regular legal services programs to carry
out a mandate for Indian self-determination would have led to many more
breakthroughs. Instead of assisting grass-roots Indian school boards to organize
themselves, get funding, and start operating their own schools as intended, OEO
programs have by and large carried on a traditional legal aid operation, prin-
cipally dependent upon lawsuits.
Sadly, the discrepancy between mandate and performance has advanced
so far that some OEO programs find themselves in open competition for funds
and prestige with many of their own client school boards, committees, or groups.
In late 1971 many of these clients united to form the first national grass-roots
Indian education organization-the Coalition of Indian-Controlled School
Boards-created to speed up the transfer of educational programs to Indians.26
By reason primarily of organizational rivalries, the two grantees of the OEO
Indian education legal grant have reacted to the Coalition with suspicion and
a touch of jealousy.
Divergence of interests between Indians and legal aid first became apparent
to me while working for Dinebeiina Nahiilna Be Agaditahe, Inc. (DNA), an
OEO program for Navajos.2 6" 1 The name means "Lawyers who work for the Eco-
nomic Revitalization of the People." It took about a year to discern a general
pattern of assistance. All of our clients were forced to come to DNA and leave
solution to their problems in Anglo hands. Rarely did DNA lawyers meaning-
fully consult their clients about cases once the facts were established. Decisions
were effectively left to newly graduated lawyers who assured clients that all would
be taken care of.
Despite our firm belief in the "radical" nature of DNA, ours was a system
which closely resembled forms of aid previously available on the reservation
through missionaries, schoolteachers and, of course, the forerunner of OEO for
Indians, the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Even our internal structure paralleled
earlier Anglo charitable enterprises for Indians. Just as the churches and the
BIA were in the habit of hiring squadrons of Indians to fill low-level positions,
so too did DNA have a corps of "interpreters/counselors," all Navajo, who
acted as investigators, translators and lay advocates for Indians. These 20
24 Budget Justification for Fiscal Year 1974, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Indian
Affairs, p. 1A-3. (This figure does not include Indian Students in public school districts
controlled by Indian-majority school boards.)
25 Hawkins, supra note 23.
26 Greider, Indian Runaround, The Washington Post, Nov. 7, 1971, at B3.
26.1 DNA is distinguishable from NARF and Harvard in the sense that DNA is a field legal
services program and handles ordinary legal aid cases as well as test cases usually referred to
as law reform. DNA had no part in soliciting the funds for or the administration of the funds
for the Legal Education Support project. In at least two cases, Natonabah v. Gallup-McKinley
County Board of Education, 355 F. Supp. 716 (D.N.M. 1973), and Denetclarence v. Inde-
pendent School Dist. No. 22, filed in New Mexico Federal District Court, DNA joined with
Harvard and NARF in filing major Indian education cases.
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Navajos did a remarkable job in expanding the range of DNA's services, but
they were all subordinate, in a practical sense, to the 20 attorneys, who outranked
them in prestige and pay. Conditions may have improved since my days at
DNA. 26.2
In short, our activities were virtually indistinguishable from previous Anglo
benevolence-all well-intentioned no doubt but as useful in changing colonialistic
behavior as the yearly Christmas presents delivered to the Navajos by the U.S.
Air Force. Instead of reforming relationships between oppressed poor people
and the dominant rich, DNA lawyers, with their law suits, legal jargon, and
aggressive personalities, were actually reinforcing Navajo dependence on whites.
B. The Ramah Example
A case at DNA in which I was involved, eventually produced a different
model for legal assistance. It concerned a remote, windswept, western New
Mexico Navajo settlement at Ramah. In June, 1968, a public school district
closed the only high school in the area. Without a local school Navajo students
faced the prospect of leaving home for nine months each year to attend distant
federal boarding schools (which the Senate Subcommittee described as "cus-
todial institutions at best, and repressive, penal institutions at worst") .21
Upon getting the case, DNA filed a lawsuit.2 ' For a year and a half DNA
tried without success to force reopening of the Ramah school. Although we had
a sympathetic judge and what we thought was a strong legal argument, the
complexities of law and politics deprived us of a significant victory in court.
So, the Navajo students remained in boarding schools. Their situation looked
hopeless.
Then something remarkable happened. The Ramah Navajo community-
1,500 impoverished, illiterate, non-English-speaking, isolated Indians-decided
to found their own school. No other Indian community in this century had
attempted to do this. Even Rough Rock had been conceived and planned by
experts external to the community-mostly non-Indians-who developed a plan
and then suggested that the community run the school. Even the facilities of
a brand-new BIA boarding school had been available for the project. 29 But
at Ramah, local members of an Indian community decided to start their own
school from scratch."0
26.2 Since my days at DNA two Navajo laymen have occupied the director's position. Given
the organization's continuing emphasis on legal training, it would seem unlikely that internal
dynamics relating to the counselors would change greatly as a result; but according to Peterson
Zah, a Navajo and DNA's current director, 75% of DNA's counselors now, through periodic pay
raises, make as much as the average lawyer's salary. OEO has conditioned continued funding of
the program on enlarging the influence in the program of local bar associations, traditionally
hostile to legal services programs. Many of DNA's problems while I was there stemmed too from
internal dissensions generally ascribed to the aggressive personality of the non-Indian director.
Zah says that since his replacement, internal relations have improved and the result has bene-
fited the program as a whole.
27 Senate Rept., supra note 15, at 103.
28 Ben Jose v. Gallup-McKinley County School Board, 12913 - Civil (N.M. llth J.D.
1968).
29 D. Esicxsou & H. SCHWARTZ, COMMUNITY SCHOOL AT ROUGH ROCK: AN EvALUA-
TION FOR THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY (Contract No. B89-4534 at 2.15-2.18)
(1969).
30 Washington Post, April 19, 1970, at A 19.
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Merely to say that the Ramah people succeeded, that seven months after
starting out they opened their own school with 130 of their children home from
boarding school, cannot possibly convey what really happened. Ramah was
transformed. A previously passive, subservient people, forced into docility by
the U.S. Cavalry in the 19th century, seized the initiative to change their lives.
Admittedly, the Ramah Navajo School Board had outside help; but the
assistance was provided on Ramah's terms and mostly at Ramah's expense.
That made it possible for the Ramah Navajo School Board to do what a team
of Ivy League lawyers had failed to do in almost two years; i.e., return a school
to its community.
The Ramah example suggested that in Indian education traditional meth-
ods of legal service relying on lawyers doing something for people were not as
effective as methods promoting self-help. And equally important, it showed
that lawsuits in Indian education may not be generally useful in bringing about
true reform. Even if DNA had succeeded in reopening Ramah high school, it
still would have been under non-Indian, and consequently unresponsive, control.
Because of the shocking facts revealed by the Special Senate Subcommittee,
and the subsequent successes of Ramah, Rough Rock, and of Navajo Commu-
nity College, the first Indian-run college, public attention in the early 1970's
was attracted to Indian education. The President's Message called attention
to the exciting developments at these schools. TV networks journeyed to the re-
mote reaches of Navajoland to produce documentaries about little Navajo children
going to school in their own communities and receiving instruction in their own
language. Streams of youthful students flowed to the schools as volunteers and
interns. It was, therefore, not suprising to discover that Indian education came
to the attention of the wealthy board rooms of several large foundations.
III. Foundation Grants
In early 1970 two private civil rights organizations, long involved in educa-
tional issues, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. and the
Harvard Center for Law and Education, began to produce a report on abuses of
federal funding of Indian education in public school districts where about two-
thirds of Indian children are enrolled. An Even Chance, as this report was
called, appeared in late 1970."' Several months later, in June, 1971, OEO made a
grant of $249,999 for a two-year, two-month period to the Center for Law and
Education at Harvard and to the Native American Rights Fund (NARF) of
Boulder, Colorado, for the "Indian Education Legal Support Program." Har-
vard and NARF were to operate the project jointly, Harvard as an ann of the
Harvard Graduate School of Education and of the Harvard Law School, and
NARF, as a Ford Foundation-funded equivalent to the NAACP, Inc. Fund.
The grant marked the first federal or private money in any significant amount to
be directed toward legal assistance in Indian education. 2 What help Indians
31 NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. WITH THE COOPERATION OF
THE CENTER FOR LAW AND EDUCATION, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, AN EVEN CHANCE: A REPORT
ON FEDERAL FUNDS FOR INDIAN CHILDREN IN PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1971).
32 Interview with Nancy Pettis, supra note 22.
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obtained prior to this grant had to be sought haphazardly from legal services
programs with general mandates, such as DNA, on Indian reservations, or urban
centers, or from the private bar.
Although there is some dispute on this point, it seems clear from the grant
documents, and especially from the joint proposal submitted by Harvard and
NARF to OEO, that the project's principal purpose was to underscore the ever-
mounting Indian campaign for control of schools:
The primary focus of efforts to improve Indian education should be com-
munity organization on reservations (federal and "state" reservations) and
in off-reservation areas of high Indian concentration. Lawyers can provide
vitally needed support to community people attempting to improve the
quality of their children's education.33
Toward this end, both NARF and Harvard made very clear their intention to
expend the project funds in innovative ways largely derived from the legal services
experience at Ramah:
The 'hypothesis upon which the proposed program would be based is that
lawyers can furnish significant and necessary research and support to com-
munities engaged in improvement of Indian education through technical
assistance as well as bringing lawsuits ....
Indeed the most useful work that lawyers can do is likely not to be litigation,
but rather ongoing support and counsel for efforts of local communities."
In later progress reports this emphasis on the importance of community control
and organizing is repeated: "Perhaps the most exciting development in the field
of Indian education is the movement for local Indian control of Indian edu-
cation.""
IV. The Results of the Grants
An examination of the November, 1972, progress report from Harvard
and NARF to OEO suggests that to a large extent the money has not been used
in these ways. Of approximately 36 cases, projects, or matters mentioned, fully
14 are lawsuits. Three others are administrative proceedings of an adversary
nature which could lead to lawsuits. Four are legislative and legal monitoring
activities which generally engage lawyers in traditionally argumentative or
legalistic ways. One was a two-month effort by a project attorney to write a
definitive law review article on Indian education. Ten are claimed as com-
munity-controlled projects, although the actual amount of time spent on them
is not revealed (as it is not for any of the other items except for one law suit for
which it is said: "The Center spent more than a full month preparing for and
33 From project proposals for the grant submitted by the Center for Law and Education,
David L. Kirp, Director, and the Native American Rights Fund, David H. Getches, Director,
undated, Spring, 1971.
34 Id.
35 INDIAN EDUCATION LEGAL SUPPORT PROJECT, CENTER FOR LAW AND EDUCATION AND
NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, REPORT FOR NOVEMBER, 1972.
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conducting the trial which was held in Albuquerque the week of July 19. More
than 200 exhibits were offered in evidence by plaintiffs. Posttrial briefs and
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law have been filed by all parties").
The remaining projects involve compilation of statistics on Indian education,
preparing a synopsis of the legislative history for an important Indian educa-
tion law, assemblage of an "Indian education packet" for "legal services offices
and other Indian educational organizations," newsletters, and assistance to
established Indian education organizations and tribes. At no point in the 68-
page, legal-size document is there a single quote from clients showing their
feelings about the project; nor has OEO conducted an evaluation of the
program. NARF and Harvard lawyers wrote the piece themselves. 6
This report, massive as it is, can give only a surface impression of how the
project has operated and how effective it has been. The document itself fails to
list the amount of time or money spent on any single item. But, in general, if
one can assume that the average law suit of the kind brought by the project
demands at least 300-500 hours of professional time, it is not an exaggerated
estimate to suppose that the 14 lawsuits mentioned in the report alone consumed
over half the funds for the project and probably most of the time of the three
lawyers employed pursuant to the grant. In short, the original emphasis on non-
litigious methods of using lawyers for Indian education appears somehow to
have been lost. On the basis of this report it seems that the project, like the
DNA of my experience, has remained rooted in old-fashioned adversarial molds.
Statistics alone can never tell the full story of a social program; subjective
analysis is essential for any accurate evaluation. Such an evaluation might be
based on several examples of how the Indian Education Legal Support Project
has operated." Only in this way can a beginning be made to relate this project
to self-determination in education. Self-determination has been recognized by
Indians, the Special Senate Subcommittee, the President, and OEO as the single
most pressing need in Indian education. (I do not and could not conduct a
thorough evaluation of the project myself, and this little exercise should not be
interpreted as such. My aim is rather to establish a framework around which
social projects of this kind should be viewed and judged. It is an exercise in
determining when a program ceases being a rich man's charity and starts being
a poor man's weapon.)
A. Consultation with Indians in Securing Grants
Despite the powerful rhetoric in the joint proposal about Indian self-
determination and community control, Harvard and NARF solicited and
secured the grant without informing or consulting with any recognized Indian
organization or group other than a small Indian consulting team with little
experience in Indian education. 8 Not even the Indian board or task force
36 Id.
37 Comments about events which follow are from the author's personal knowledge unless
otherwise noted.
38 Acknowledged in letter to OEO dated May 18, 1972, and signed David H. Getches. The
Indian consulting organization was the National Indian Training and Research Center of
Tempe, Arizona (NITRC). At the same time that NARF and Harvard were given their
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associated with each of the two organizations was told of the impending project.
The directors of the organizations simply formulated a proposal, and presented
it to a receptive contact at OEO. All was done behind closed doors-a technique
which used to be characteristic of OEO, and which depended on an
"old boy network" of people who can be said to have constituted a national
poverty law establishment. The impetus for the proposal came from An Even
Chance,s" which once again attracted the media to the plight of helpless Indians.
Successful grantsmanship in the OEO experience has often turned on reports of
this kind that, by setting out the problem, invite a grant of funds to solve it.
The point to be made is that this usual and nondevious device for soliciting
funds from OEO in this instance directly contradicted the philosophy and pur-
pose of the proposed project itself. Thus, the grant which followed to help solve
the problem of lack of Indian control actually exemplified it. As later events
suggest, mere insertion into the document of rhetoric endorsing innovative uses
of lawyers in a program promoting self-help has not been sufficient to prevent
the project from reverting to standard legal aid practices. The way in which the
project was funded probably greatly influenced its operation.
B. Natonabah v. Gallup-McKinley County Board of Education
The very first matter mentioned in the November, 1972, progress report is
Natonabah v. Gallup-McKinley County Board of Education,"0 a New Mexico
case in which DNA, NARF, and Harvard joined to challenge discriminatory
practices against Indians. This challenge was based largely on the misuse of
federal funds exposed in An Even Chance. At the time of the progress report,
the case had yet to be decided, but several months later the United States District
Court of New Mexico issued an opinion finding that "there has been a clear
pattern of discrimination against the Indian students in the Gallup-McKinley
County School District in capital outlays and operational expenditures and there
has been a diversion of Title I and Johnson-O'Malley funds for purposes for
which they were not intended.""' This victory is generally considered the Legal
$249,999 grant, NITRO received a grant of $199,733 for an eleven-month period to offer com-
munity development assistance to Indian groups in conjunction with the Legal Support Project.
Special Condition Number 1 of this grant appearing on CAP Form 29, July 1, 1971, reads:
The grantee shall work cooperatively with and take into consideration educational
programs and efforts being conducted by the Educational Legal Back-Up Center and
Special Indian Education Demonstration, e.g., Navajo Community College, Ramah
High School and Rough Rock Demonstration School.
Yet at no time, according to Abe Plummer, Director of Ramah Navajo High School (infra
note 49), did NITRC or OEO consult Ramah about this community assistance project or even
tell it that such a program of assistance would be available. In fact, reports Plummer, there
has to this date been no NITRC aid for Ramah of any kind. The author has no knowledge
of whether NITRC gave assistance to either of the other two schools mentioned in the Special
Condition.
39 Reference made to AN EVEN CHANCE in the Joint Project Proposal, supra note 33, at 1.
40 355 F. Supp. 716, 718 (D.N.M. 1973); a similar case arising in the Shiprock, New
Mexico, public school district on the Navajo Reservation is Deneclarence v. Independent
School Dist. No. 22, which has been filed in New Mexico Federal District Court and has not
yet gone to trial. The fact that Natonabah is accompanied by yet another case raising the
same issues merely highlights the waste of professional time and grant funds by NARF, Harvard
and DNA, which is the principal criticism of Natonabah.
41 Id. at 733.
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Support Project's crowning achievement." On closer examination a different
verdict may be appropriate.
In late 1970 DNA filed the suit on behalf of Indian students against the
State Department of Education, the United States Departments of the Interior
and of Health, Education and Welfare, and the Gallup-McKinley district, which
has more Indian students than any other school system in the country (7,000).
After the Legal Support Project was funded, Harvard and NARF became in-
volved in the suit and eventually assumed command of it. (The comments cited
above of the November, 1972, progress report relative to time and energy in-
vested in the Albuquerque trial are pursuant to this case.) 4"
The action focused on one of just those quantifiable, surface aspects of
Indian miseducation-misuse of money-which I suspect diverts attention from
underlying causes of the Indian education tragedy. For example, the entire 17-
page opinion is devoid of all but a passing reference to educational substance. It
is a suit based on economic statistics. From the court's opinion one can scarcely
glean the terrible psychological traumas which must be visited on Indian children
in the district who are forced by subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, means to
abandon their Indian culture. Nowhere is there mention of the high Indian
dropout or pushout rate. Nowhere is there mention of how professional educa-
tional services for Indian children can be improved. Nowhere is there mention
of the exciting developments in the districts around Gallup-McKinley such as
those at Ramah.
And what was the suit's practical outcome? The court ordered the local
district, the sole remaining defendant after the federal and state defendants
were dismissed or found faultless, to come up with a plan "designed to overcome
the disparities existing because of the unequal allocation of construction and
operational funds."4 The underlying assumption, never explicitly stated but
pervasive nevertheless, is that provision of "equal" state resources and proper
use of federal compensatory funds for Indian education will suffice to overcome
the incredible failures of learning and teaching in these public schools.
That assumption is not borne out elsewhere. Even where Indian students
attend the same school facilities, share in use of the same equipment as non-
Indians, and are the beneficiaries, by and large, of special funds for their educa-
tion such as in Fremont County, Wyoming, where Indian students attend off-
reservation, non-Indian-controlled high schools, educational failures continue.
Indian students in the two off-reservation high schools in Fremont County are
reported to withdraw from school in the same numbers as those of Indians else-
where and to suffer from the same low-achievement levels."
There is a further irony in Natonabah-the parties. Since the early days
of the suit, the defendant local district has been governed by a board with a
majority of Indians who are all named in the suit and sued both individually
42 E.g. telephone conversation with NARF attorney, early April, 1973.
43 355 F. Supp. 716, 719 (D.N.M. 1973).
44 Id. at 725.
45 L. MuIRY, COORDINATOR, JOHNSON O'MALLEY PLAN FOR WYOMING, ANNUAL REPORT(1972).
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and in their official capacities.46 NARF, Harvard, and DNA spent two years
suing an Indian-controlled school board !41
Justification for this strange twist is alluded to in a brief remark by the
court:
The evidence is convincing that the current school board [not identified as
Indian-controlled] for the district is dedicated to preventing any inequities
in the allocation of the district's resources. There is no certainty, however,
as to how long the present board might serve or what the composition of the
board will be at any given time.48
In other words, rather than find ways to ensure that Navajos and Zunis in the
Gallup-McKinley district would be able to control their children's educations
indefinitely, NARF, Harvard and DNA proceeded on the assumption that
Indian control of the district would one day end. Their suit recognizes a neces-
sity for making recalcitrant non-Indians more responsive to Indian needs. It is
the same impulse which other Indian benefactors have shown-a desire to reform
the ways non-Indians do things for Indians. It is a pattern which studiously
avoids the central issue: the means by which the dominant society retains con-
trol over the affairs of the aggrieved.
Perhaps the worst single consequence of the suit, however, is the lawyers'
failure to coordinate their legal endeavors with the Indian community. Abe
Plummer, a Navajo member of the Gallup board (and a national Indian educa-
tion leader by virtue of his positions as Director of Ramah Navajo High School
and Vice-President of the Coalition of Indian Controlled School Boards) asserts
that there had been a very definite strategy by the Indian community through the
Indian-controlled board surrounding the suit.49 It was a strategy to gain control
over the system's administration, a largely non-Indian group which Plummer
considers chiefly responsible for the low level of Indian education in the district.
In his mind the suit could have become a very powerful weapon in the hands of
the Navajo majority on the board against the bureaucrats. But this strategy
demanded close coordination and cooperation between the plaintiffs' lawyers
and the Navajo board members. That did not occur.
"Zero," replied Plummer to the question of how much time NARF,
Harvard, and DNA spent consulting either with him or the other members of
the board during the suit. To this day, he says, no one has explained the judge's
opinion to the board, let alone begun working with it to develop constructive
ways to comply with the court's order.5"
46 355 F. Supp. 716 (D.N.M. 1973).
47 It is conceivable that an Indian-controlled school board could misuse funds and dis-
criminate against certain of its students. But in the Gallup case this was manifestly not true.
In late December 1970 and January 1971, just before the Gallup-McKinley County school
board elections, the word was that several Navajos, for the first time, would be making a con-
certed effort to gain seats on the board. Both of the leading Navajo contenders, who later won
places, John Martin and Abe Plummer, ran on reformist platforms which decried prior dis-
crimination against Indian students in the district. Yet DNA failed to wait until after the
outcome of the election to file its lawsuit.
48 Id. at 724-25.
49 Interview with Abe Plummer, April 17, 1973. The existence of this strategy is also




The suit's most probable outcome is revealed in this assessment by the court:
It is obvious that the filing of the action has been a strong influence to
cause investigation to be made and corrective action to be taken at all
levels of government. By filing suit, the plaintiffs have focused attention on
the problems and have caused the beginning, through the administrative
process, of the reforms they seek.51
Yet that assessment seems in sharp contrast to the President's own views ex-
pressed on July 8, 1970:
One of the saddest aspects of Indian life in the United States is the low
quality of Indian education.... Again, at least a part of the problem stems
from the fact that the Federal government is trying to do for Indians what
many Indians could do better for themselves. 52
Because it overlooks these broader realities, founded on a whole history of forced
Indian subservience, the court's opinion lends itself to an inference that this was
indeed a lawyer's case and a lawyer's remedy. A NARF attorney later conceded
that the resolution of the case would not result in new schools in the immediate
future." In brief, although the misallocation of resources for Indians and the
disparity of facilities and equipment focused on in Natonabah certainly exist in
many places, they are but the tip of a colossal iceberg of indifference to Indian
needs and wishes which cannot be melted down by turning a legal blowtorch on
the upper reaches.
C. NARF and Haruard's Relations with the Coalition of
Indian Controlled School Boards
The NARF-Harvard penchant for litigation is revealed in still another
episode. This one further reflects the two organizations' attitudes toward Indian
clients, at least to the extent of showing how difficult it has been for the organiza-
tions to translate intentions into action.
In the fall of 1971, a few months after the Indian Education Legal Support
Project began, the Bureau of Indian Affairs slid into a retrenchment from the
President's policy of Indian self-determination. Several Indian communities had
submitted detailed proposals for contracts to run their own schools, but were
being repeatedly put off for bureaucratic reasons. 4 In frustration, four of them
-mostly NARF clients-assembled at NARF's headquarters to discuss joint
action to shake up the BIA. This was the start of the Coalition of Indian Con-
trolled School Boards, now numbering over 100 members around the country.
With political savvy and shrewd use of public relations these nonprofes-
sionals succeeded in forcing BIA action. They managed to get William Greider
of The Washington Post to write a feature column on their situation. The
article quoted promises of funds made by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs."
51 355 F. Supp. 716, 731 (D.N.M. 1973).
52 President Richard M. Nixon's Message to Congress, supra note 21.
53 Conversation, supra note 42.
54 Greider, supra note 26.
55 Id.
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The day after it appeared the Vice-President asked his aides to check what was
going on "down at the Bureau," and within a matter of days the most trouble-
some contract, that for Wind River, Wyoming, had been signed; the dam was
broken for a time.5'
At this point the Coalition realized there was a need for continuing coordi-
nation and communication. Its members had used the simple power of grass-
roots organizing and reasoned that they ought to continue this association. As
a result, they decided to create a permanent organization offering Indian com-
munities Indian assistance toward educational improvement. To achieve this
goal they perceived a need to acquire command of the technical assets intended
for their benefit. Despite the good will of agencies and programs with resources
for them, they realized that their lack of genuine influence over those re-
sources had resulted in inefficiency and, at times, misdirection of scarce funds.
The new organization which they started marked a radical departure from pre-
vious efforts at giving Indians legal and other technical assistance in education.
It was a group composed of and operated by those who were to benefit from its
services. The idea was simple: If an Abe Plummer from Ramah or a Birgil Kills
Straight from Pine Ridge, South Dakota (president of the Coalition), or a
Frances Le May (member of a community school board in Menominee County,
Wisconsin) had acquired experience and knowledge in school reform in their
communities, then it made sense to provide a mechanism to make use of this
experience and knowledge at other locations. Instead of relying on outside, often
non-Indian experts to tell communities what to do, the Coalition with a mini-
mum of in-house professionals as backup proposed to send Abe Plummer, Birgil
Kills Straight and Frances Le May. But in order to have a meaningful basis
for providing this kind of assistance, the Coalition needed influence in guiding
existing programs offering help in reforming Indian education.
Therefore, in the autumn of 1971, the Coalition asked NARF and Harvard
for a meaningful voice in running the Indian Education Legal Support Project.
Short of turning the project over to the Coalition, the Coalition suggested that
one or two lawyers be assigned to work under the Coalition and receive their pay
from OEO funds." Despite the fact that the Coalition's membership was made
up of many NARF clients, Harvard and NARF rejected the request on the
grounds of insufficient funds. At a meeting in early January, 1972, NARF's
director, a non-Indian attorney named David H. Getches, explained that NARF
"could not" turn control of the project over to the Coalition or assign it lawyers.
He assured the Coalition that its "needs" would be cared for and then proceeded
to label the Coalition NARF's "most important Indian education client," promis-
ing to consult with it on all major Indian education questions coming to its
attention. This promise was repeated in a letter dated June 21, 1972. Charles
Wilkinson, the NARF attorney in charge of NARF's part of the Legal Support
Project, wrote OEO that:
56 Although the quote comes from an independent source, it is substantially confirmed in
The Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1971, at A2.
57 Interview with Gerald Clifford (an Oglala Sioux), Director, Coalition of Indian Con-
trolled School Boards, April 17, 1973.
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The Coalition is literally the most important client which our office has on
education matters-it would be an extraordinary situation in which, we
would not accept a request from the Coalition for legal services .... We will
immediately contact the Coalition in regard to any inquiry which we receive
concerning Community Controlled Schools.58
All this is by way of background for an unfortunate incident which then
took place. Almost simultaneously with the letter quoted above, NARF filed a
major civil rights class action lawsuit against a local public school district at
Shawano, Wisconsin, with a high Menominee Indian enrollment and against the
Wisconsin State Department of Education. "' In doing so NARF failed to inform
either the Coalition or the Indian community's own education committee whose
members were part of the class on whose behalf the suit was filed. The com-
mittee was a founding member of the Coalition, had been present through its
representatives when NARF proffered its "most important client" promise, and
had even been assisted in its formation by NARF. In July, 1971, NARF sup-
plied legal assistance to the organizers of the committee. With this help, the com-
mittee decided not to file a lawsuit to air their grievances but rather to adopt a
two-step, community-action program. Step one called for creation of a com-
munity-controlled school to demonstrate local capacity to run an educational
program for the numerous pushouts from existing public schools; step two called
for reorganizing school district lines to give the homogeneous and geographically
separate Indian community dominion over its own schools.6"
While NARF maintained an attorney-client relationship with this committee
through a consulting attorney under the legal support educational grant, an in-
dependent group of NARF attorneys visited the community in December, 1971,
on a noneducational matter. During the course of their visit, however, the
NARF lawyers were approached about some school problems by several Menom-
inee Indians not directly associated with the education committee. Without in-
forming the consulting attorney working with the education committee, the
second group of attorneys undertook to represent the people who had approached
them and several months later they filed their action-all the while failing to
inform the original NARF consulting attorney, the education committee or the
Coalition.
Ironic is the fact that at the very time the suit was filed, in late May, 1972,
the Coalition occupied a basement office at NARF as a temporary headquarters.
Although NARF alleges that the incident happened because of "logistical prob-
lems" associated with its move ten months previous from Berkeley, California,
to Boulder, Colorado, it remains that NARF's attorneys were preparing and filing
a significant Indian education law suit upstairs while the Coalition was making
telephone calls and typing letters downstairs.6 This developed at the same time
that the committee was entering negotiations with the same officials who were
named as defendants in the suit.
58 Letter to OEO dated June 21, 1972, signed Charles F. Wilkinson.
59 Wilber v. Bd. of Educ. of Joint School Dist. No. 8, Civil No. 72-C-165 '(W.D. Wisc.).
60 Interview with Atlee Dodge, Director, Menominee County Education Committee, Inc.,
April 1, 1973.
61 Interview with Birgil Kills Straight (an Oglala Sioux), President, Coalition of Indian
Controlled School Boards, June, 1972.
[October 1973]
LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN INDIAN EDUCATION
The committee has been forced to intervene in the suit to protect its inter-
ests, and has thus been put in an adversary position vis-a-vis the state officials it
must deal with to bring about reorganization. But that is not the worst of it.
According to Atlee Dodge, one of the committee's leaders, an Indian who
recently ran for Congress, "What the law suit has done is take local initiative
right out of the hands of the people here by having decisions made by NARF
attorneys as to whether this area has a school or not.862
The episode implies a failure by NARF to comprehend its obligations to
Indian community clients and to their chosen methods of bringing about reform.
It further suggests that by failing to implement a structure in its attorney-client
relationships allowing for significant client influence, errors such as NARF's
undertaking to simultaneously represent two groups of clients who may have
competing interests can occur. This is one way NARF has had trouble translating
its proposal language into concrete reality.
V. The Organizational Basis for Problems
One avenue of investigation which might be fruitful on the basis of the
three events described above is to ascertain whether they represent sporadic
problems in responsiveness or are endemic. If, as may be suspected, they are part
of a pattern of structural deficiencies in Indian legal services and perhaps in
other legal aid programs, then discussion and research ought to center on pro-
cedures altering the structures for providing the assistance.
Some preliminary analysis based on the OEO experience in Indian educa-
tion is justified now although it must be qualified as subjective. The views which
follow are suggestive, not conclusive, and invite further investigation by skilled
evaluators including most specifically representatives of the programs' grass-roots
clientele. Their first focus ought to be on why, despite the abundance of intel-
ligent, skilled and above all well-intentioned lawyers, programs such as Harvard,
NARF and DNA have kept initiative from their clients and otherwise neglected
their interests in cases such as the ones considered above. It is my suspicion that
these programs may not have operated as they should for institutional, organiza-
tional reasons. The systems under which these lawyers have operated may have
demanded unresponsiveness.
The problem inheres in charity. When one doesn't pay for a service he
cannot control it. An indigent client remains passive while do-gooders go to
work. DNA, NARF and Harvard represent the Salvation Army approach to
technical assistance for the poor. Sometimes the mittens match and sometimes
they don't. The result may be professionally satisfying for the lawyer but is often
ineffective from the client's standpoint. Even the Ramah case resulted in a legal
victory in court-an order directing increased bus service to an alternative public
high school 30 miles from Ramah. But that was not what the Ramah people
wanted. They wanted their own community school close to home. Examples of
this disparity between success in court and substantial social reform may be taken
from many fields besides education.
62 Interview with Atlee Dodge, April 1, 1973.
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In 1969, for example, DNA filed a federal court action seeking an order to
force the Bureau of Indian Affairs to bring trading post monopolies under regula-
tion on the Navajo Reservation. When the U.S. District Court of Arizona
dismissed the complaint, DNA appealed and won what at the time was con-
sidered a significant victory in the Ninth Circuit. " Here was proof positive of
the efficacy of law reform. Courts can be used to bring about meaningful social
reform for Indians. Yet four years after the suit was filed nothing has actually
changed.
The Federal Trade Commission conducted a study and recently released a
report on the trading post system on the Navajo Reservation which, in the words
of the Race Relations Reporter, is "scathing.""4 Newsweek says the report
"charges that traders are cheating and defrauding the 135,000 Navajos while the
Interior Department's Bureau of Indian Affairs, which is responsible for regulat-
ing the traders on the reservation, ignores the abuses.""5 The article continues
that "[t]o prevent future abuses, the report recommends that supervision of
traders be taken away from the BIA and turned over to the Navajos,""6 a solu-
tion apparently never considered at DNA. (I was employed at DNA when the
suit was filed and participated in its preparation. OEO had conducted an
evaluation of DNA the month preceding the filing and had criticized DNA for
not suing the BIA more frequently. Little attention was paid to alternative
solutions to the trading post problem, and the program director ordered that
the complaint be prepared against the Bureau without consulting either the
DNA board or the tribe.)" r
On the basis of these experiences it would seem that law reform in its usual
meaning-"significant" lawsuits-cannot reach the subtle relationships between
the oppressed and the dominant society which constitute the heart of the
problem. This inability has led to the absurdity of lawyers urging Indians to take
over their own schools while denying them control of the technical resources
needed to do it. The inability stems from failure to address a basic question:
What happens to a lawyer's fiduciary duty when his client's interest demands he
take over his lawyer's functions? In my observation, legal services have simply
failed in many cases to see their roles as transitional; that having nurtured a
client's capability to help himself, it is the lawyer's obligation to remove himself.
Eventually he must leave his client in command of his own destiny. This pattern
is especially germane to professionals as distinguished from nondegree-holding
63 Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971).
64 Sheppard, Turning Back Cuts In Social Services, 4 RACE RELATIONS REPORTER, No.
13 at 2 (1973).
65 NEWSWEEK, June 25, 1973, at 74.
66 Id.
67 But see, e.g., McClanahan v. Tax Comm'n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), which held
that Arizona may not tax the personal incomes of Indians living and working on Indian reserva-
tions. DNA has been moderately successful in using the law reform technique to strengthen
Navajo tribal sovereignty with regard to the states in which the reservation is located. NARF
has also been successful to a degree in preventing state encroachment on Indian rights; see, e.g.,
Pyramid Lake of Paiute Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972). In other areas
of litigation the successes have not been plentiful. One exception is a companion case to a
lawsuit filed this year in Federal District Court by the Coalition seeking release of federal funds
for Indian education under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318,
86 Stat. 270: Redman v. Weinberger and Minnesota Band of Chippewas v. Weinberger, F.
Supp. (D.D.C. 1973).
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workers for the poor. I have noticed, for example, that many VISTA volunteers
on the reservation who were neither lawyers nor educators nor professional social
workers developed a keen understanding of the amorphous psychological syn-
dromes affecting the people with whom they worked. They understood that
initially the central problem facing the oppressed is the outside do-gooder him-
self.
An explanation for the disparity between purpose and attainment of legal
services in Indian education independent of the peculiar mind-set of professionals
relates to organizational behavior. OEO's resources were given to institutions
rather than to individuals. (The VISTA example is apt. There volunteers for
the most part worked for no middle man but were assigned directly to com-
munity organizations. Although the payment mechanism still interfered with
firsthand accountability-the VISTAs got government checks-the individuality
of their roles may have helped shield them from the danger of making decisions
for others.) Simply stated, organizations do not normally terminate themselves
voluntarily; even when they become anachronistic and even, curiously enough,
when they acknowledge contradictions between their operations and funding.
Self-liquidation is probably rare because organizations honestly tend to equate
their interests with those they serve. The competition for funds and prestige
which has surfaced between the Coalition and Harvard-NARF is probably due
to the latter's insistence that its work is essential to benefit its clients. It is a
proprietary instinct. Once, when the Coalition asked NARF for legal assistance
anonymously (to protect the Coalition's own future fund-raising), NARF re-
fused: "We have to be realistic," said a NARF spokesman. "We have to get our
bread some way too.""es
The organizational framework of the OEO Indian education legal grant
has led to development of a we-they view. The Coalition, though springing
from close association with NARF, has become an outsider. It has been treated
as anything but a client. In reality, as soon as a group of NARF's clients banded
together to form a separate entity they were perceived by NARF as a "they."
Since then NARF and Harvard in varying degrees have declaimed the Coalition
as a more legitimate community spokesman than themselves. When first ap-
proached about sharing control of the OEO grant with the Coalition, Marian
Wright Edelman, the Harvard Center's director at the time, asked, "How do I
know the Coalition is legitimate? How do I know whether their claim to be a
grass-roots Indian organization is correct?" 9 The answer was twofold: first,
that Harvard had no business questioning their client's legitimacy; and second,
that no other Indian group was competing on the same basis for recognition. The
Coalition was the only group claiming to be composed of and acting as a limited
spokesman for grass-roots Indians in education across the country."0
68 Interview with Gerald Clifford, supra note 57.
69 Interview with Marian Wright Edelman, November 29, 1971, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
70 The issue of who speaks for communities pervades poverty law and government theory
in general. The view favored by the author is that anybody who claims to speak for a com-
munity ought to be given the benefit of a positive presumption that he does, unless his claim is
patently absurd or until someone else appears with better credentials. But this was not the issue
relative to the Coalition, which was Harvard-NARF's client and which alone of Indian organi-
zations claimed to be a spokesman for grass-roots Indians on education.
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Analyzing organizational behavior is a delicate process because it neces-
sarily calls for dealing with individuals. Organizations act, think, and speak
through individuals. To learn more about how organizations confuse their own
interests with those of their clients, it is imperative to take as material the acts or
expressions of individuals. It is with this in mind that several written comments
of the directors of the Harvard Center and NARF should be reviewed.
A. Competition for Control
In May, 1972, disagreement occurred between Harvard and NARF about
future control of the OEO Indian education money. NARF's former director,
David Getches, wrote a letter to OEO proposing that NARF take over complete
control of the project. In the letter he listed a key reason why NARF should
be given full control-its "sensitivity" to Indian needs and wishes:
Fund attorneys are continually in contact with Indian tribes and com-
munities throughout the country. This contact, besides making them aware
of particular legal problems, sensitizes them to the things which Indian
people feel are important and the approaches to the problems which they
think are desirable. 71
This claim bears an astonishing resemblance to the standard BIA justification
for its manipulation of Indian lives: its "closeness" to Indian people.72 Both
NARF and the BIA substitute physical proximity to Indians for substantive
program control by Indians. This substitution is a classic example of the con-
fusion so prevalent in benevolent institutions such as NARF between organiza-
tional self-interest and clients' interests.
Harvard's former director, Marian Edelman, who it should be noted
assumed her position after OEO had funded the Indian Education Legal Sup-
port Project and had nothing to do with the way the grant had been made,
wrote a response. In it she reveals yet another institutional handicap which may
be prevalent in programs based on professional service; i.e., professional elitism
which assumes that no one is qualified to develop solutions to problems unless he
has a diploma. In Harvard's letter to OEO defending its participation in the
project the distinction made is between "service to Indian people and groups,"
conceded to be important and within NARF's bailiwick (primarily because of
its geographical location), and "program development,"'7 a research function
for which Harvard is best suited primarily because Harvard
... has an ability to think through programs in Indian education in order
71 Getches, supra note 38.
72 The BIA has recently decentralized its contacting procedures. Until April, 1973, Indian
Contract Schools could negotiate with high BIA officials in Washington. Now they must deal
with local BIA Area Directors, who often have interests in preserving their own bureaucracies
contrary to Indian interest in taking over Bureau functions. The BIA's justification for the
decentralization is to bring decision-making in the BIA "closer" to the people. In a meeting on
April 10, 1973, with representatives of the Coalition of Indian Controlled School Boards, the
Interior Department's Assistant to the Secretary for Indian Affairs, Marvin L. Franklin, stated
that he believed local Bureau personnel were better able to make decisions affecting Indians
than the administrators in Washington, D.C.
73 Letter to OEO dated May 17, 1972, signed by Marian Wright Edelman.
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to enable other groups (her emphasis) to choose to act in ways they think
important.... I do not think NARF has the expertise to engage in long-
range and thoughtful development in Indian education. 4
It is questionable whether action and contemplation, especially in poverty
programs, can ever be successfully separated. First, the separation is bound to
leave clients completely out of planning; second, it is questionable whether
theory can ever be productive in social relations if not firmly rooted in particular
human situations. Harvard's performance would suggest not. Its geographical
and cerebral distance from the field has prevented it from becoming fully
acquainted with its clients, as shown by an incident in December, 1971, shortly
after the Coalition's triumph over the BIA in the Wind River case.
In that month Harvard called a meeting 5 to discuss amendments to regu-
lations under an important Indian education law, the Johnson-O'Malley Act.
No one from the Coalition had been invited. But Abe Plummer, representing
the Coalition, attended anyway and became angered when no one from Harvard
could adequately explain why the Coalition was not on the guest list. One of
its attorneys lamely pleaded that he had tried to call the Coalition's president,
Birgil Kills Straight, an Oglala Sioux from Pine Ridge, South Dakota, but failed
to reach him. He was then asked why he had not tried calling anyone else from
the Coalition, Abe Plummer for instance, who was sitting right next to him.
The attorney fidgeted at which Plummer, no novice when it comes to bureau-
cracies, turned to the director of the Harvard Center sitting on his other side,
looked her in the eye, pounded his fist on the table, and in a low, decisive voice
said: "You don't even know who we are! You don't even know who we are!"
Based on these glimpses of the inner institutional workings of legal assis-
tance in Indian education, one tentative conclusion to be drawn is that the
problem does not stem from Mr. Agnew's perception that these programs are
"tax-funded social activism." The problem is that it is the lawyer's activism.
The lawyer enjoys the choices. The lawyer establishes decision-making environ-
ments for his clients. (I well remember my first few weeks at Ramah thinking
how wonderful it was that the Rainah Navajo School Board was making all
the decisions for the school. I did not realize that by presenting circumstances
requiring decisions to them and then defining possible alternatives, I was effec-
tively influencing the Board's own dynamics and hence their decisions.) He
who controls initiative controls everything. Thus DNA, which rarely deferred
to true client control, was mostly smoke and little fire. There was no genuine
revitalization going on, no revolution, as its name implied or its staff claimed.
The Ramah Navajo School succeeded largely despite DNA; not because of it.
B. Conflicting Interests of the Poor
Another set of problems arises when the Government and the programs
confuse the interests of some of the poor with those of other groups of poor.
When OEO, for example, gives the Harvard Center money to help "the poor"
74 Id.
75 The author was present at this meeting.
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with "education problems" and then avoids careful guidelines as to how choices
of clients, cases, and tactics are to be made, it invites development of internal
conflicts. Such may have happened at Harvard because of its heavy commit-
ment to integration, a tangential interest at best in Indian education.
In her letter to OEO, Marian Edelman seems to lump all of Harvard's client
communities together:
What Harvard staff can offer is broad experience and contact with labor,
education, civil rights groups without whose help Indian education is going
to end up being an aside. The realities of Washington is [sic] that blacks
alone, Indians alone, have no power. It is within the framework of broader
coalitions based on mutual interest that real help is going to come.7 6
Elsewhere she previously said:
Just as the basic hope for blacks in the South to get a fair share of resources
is through desegregation, it can be convincingly argued that in the North
only by binding the destiny of other groups to blacks on educational matters
can a strong enough force for adequate resources be mounted. 77
Intragroup unity among the aggrieved is commendable in theory. But
Indians and blacks may not share interests that give a coalition meaning unless
it be based on a precise understanding of the importance of flexibility in plan-
ning social reordering. By and large Indians are not confronted with forcible
exclusion (segregation) from society as are blacks. Their problem has been
almost the reverse-forcible inclusion; or in the words of the Special Senate
Subcommittee, "coercive assimilation [has been the] dominant policy of the
Federal Government towards Indians.""8 It "has resulted in the destruction and
disorganization of Indian communities and individuals [and has led to] the
classroom and the school becoming a kind of battleground where the Indian
child attempts to protect his integrity, and identity as an individual by defeating
the purposes of the school."7 White America has perceived and treated Indians
differently from blacks, as the Subcommittee recognized:
Ever since the policy of educating Indians in public schools was adopted,
it was assumed that the public schools, with their integrated settings, were
the best means of educating Indians. The subcommittee's public school
findings--high dropout rates, low achievement levels, anti-Indian attitudes,
insensitive curriculums-raise serious doubts as to the validity of that as-
sumption.8 0
76 Edelman letter, supra note 73.
77 Edelman, The Debate Over School Desegregation, THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 21,
1970, at 27. The statement is one of a series of responses to an article published in THE NE w
REPUBLIC on February 7, 1970, by Professor Alexander M. Bickel of Yale Law School. His
article was one of the first to raise the question whether integration should or even can be
carried beyond legal desegregation to implement racial balance in schools and whether talents
and resources might not be better direced towards improving substantive educational programs
and granting minorities greater control over them.
78 Senate Rept., supra note 15, at 21.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 31.
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The failure to see distinctions between the black experience and Indian
experience leads to a policy-making fallacy: that similar solutions apply to the
predicament of both groups. This becomes plain not only because the record
of Indian education in "integrated" schools is so poor, but also because Indians
have always received public resources by reason of their special relationship to
the federal government. Indians are the only ethnic group for whom the Gov-
ernment has unique, fiduciary obligations arising in part from the Constitution
itself."' The resulting system of federal services to Indians is a prized resource
despite the flaws of the BIA. Hence, there is almost universal aversion among
Indians to termination of services based on that special relationship. The Menom-
inees of Wisconsin, for example, date the tragic decline of their children's
education to the 1961 termination-the date their children were systematically
"integrated" into a white-controlled school district."2 For traditional Indians,
at least, remaining sociologically and politically distinct has almost universally
been conceived of as the only way to social justice.
For now it is unimportant who is right about integration and self-deter-
mination. What is important is that disjunctive interests between different
groups in society are being perceived. The former Harvard director has said,
for example, that "those who are softening on integration are now grasping at
community control as an alternative,"8" while Wassazja, a new Indian newspaper
published by the American Indian Historical Society, says in its very first edito-
rial, "If we were to define the one strategic need of our people it would have
to be self-determination."8 4 When attempting to represent both points of view,
as Harvard gives the impression of doing, it is put in a very awkward position,
bordering on a conflict of interest.
Although this conflict of loyalties may not have resulted in concrete, specif-
ic harm to either Indians or blacks, the fact remains that the issue apparently
has never been seriously debated at Harvard or OEO. Client communities may
therefore be justified in assuming that one reason for Harvard's seeming lack
of enthusiasm for the "strategic need" of Indian people is its heavy commitment
to another broad mechanism for social justice.
C. The Law Firm Analogy
While NARF does not suffer from Harvard's dual loyalties, it too has
organizational deficiencies, which it shares with numerous other legal services
programs. These concern corporate structure and social theory. NARF is sup-
posedly governed by a "steering committee" of Indians." Yet the committee
does not really have full control of the operation because, according to David
Getches, NARF is a "law firm" and outside influence would be in violation of
the attorney-client relationship." The degree of control such a steering committee
81 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97
(1942); Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 '(9th Cir. 1971).
82 Interview with Atlee Dodge, supra note 62.
83 Edelman, supra note 77, at 27.
84 The Indian's Signal for Self-Determination, Wassaja, Jan. 1973 (editorial).
85 NARF Bylaws, undated.
86 Interview with then director David H. Getches, Boulder, Colorado, March 2, 1972.
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should have is the issue. Any resulting power vacuum is usually filled by NARF
attorneys.
NARF is not another White and Case or Arnold and Porter. Persistent
invocation of the law firm analogy merely shields NARF lawyers from undue
influence from anybody outside the staff on such questions as whom to represent,
what lawsuits to file, and what strategy to employ--even though many of these
questions have a profound impact on Indian politics and policy.
The curiosity is that Getches acknowledges the peculiar and sensitive nature
of legal work among Indians."7 In the May, 1972, issue of the NLADA Brief-
case he writes in an article entitled "Difficult Beginnings for Indian Legal Ser-
vices" that:
It is quite difficult for a typical non-Indian attorney who is a newcomer
to the reservation and to the community to make the delicate policy judg-
ments concerning what cases should and should not be taken in order to
avoid an infringement of the tribe's governmental prerogatives.88
Yet it seems he is unable to take the next logical step and embrace the need
for turning over real power to Indian clients to make decisions. Instead he
proposes that Indian legal services simply hire more Indian lawyers."9 In this
instance NARF's inability to think through its position closely resembles its pre-
vious reaction when confronted by the Coalition's demands for increased influ-
ence over the Legal Support Project. At that time NARF failed to suggest
anything more meaningful than "close consultation" between the Coalition and
the project. NARF failed to see that the funding flaws in that grant sprang
from reliance on the consulting-with-Indians technique. None of NARF's
responses to problems it concedes to exist rise to the level of restructuring the
service mechanisms.
This inconsistency relates to both the historical way non-Indians have treated
Indians--as passive beneficiaries at best-and to the structure through which
NARF operates. This structure seems responsible for placing so much pressure
on NARF lawyers to maintain an independent status answerable to no one
but an ill-defined group of clients. "Indeed," continues the former director,
"it would be improper for attorneys, whose primary duty is to represent individ-
ual clients, to take into account interests other than those of the client."90
This rationale might be acceptable if NARF really were a law firm. But
NARF and other legal services programs are quite dissinilar to private law
firms. The former are separate institutions and enterprises with their own goals,
political programs and strategies. These are assumed to coincide with the in-
terests of the poor, but as we see in Indian education, often do not. The law
firm comparison breaks down in each of the elements essential for making and
keeping private lawyers from engaging in activities contrary to their clients'
interests:
87 Getches was NARF's founding director and chief guiding light until the spring of 1973
when he resigned as director and was replaced by former staff attorney John Echohawk, a
Pawnee from New Mexico. Getches remains on NARF's staff as an attorney.
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1. First and foremost, a law firm charges fees. If a client is unhappy with
the service he gets, he hires another lawyer. The payment mechanism is the
basic tool for ensuring professional excellence. Not so in legal services. These
are all charitable monopolies which stake out a field and protect their domination
over it as ruthlessly as any international cartel. According to Edgar and Jean
Calm, this "monopoly power can be and is rationalized in numerous ways by
men of good will: they are doing their best; they are providing important ser-
vices and goods; ingratitude should not be allowed to reflect on their professional
integrity." 91 Yet the good will has not prevented a growing awareness that the
interests of legal services programs may sometimes be antagonistic to those of
their clients, as the Calms pointed out as early as 1966: "And slowly, but surely,
neighborhood law firms, while paradoxically shedding light in an effective
manner on the problems of the poor have already begun the long road to un-
responsiveness."9 2 Furthermore, poverty lawyers' paychecks come every two
weeks no matter how they perform. In the year and a half I worked at DNA,
for example, not a single lawyer was discharged for incompetence based on a
client's complaint, although several were fired for irritating the director. DNA
evaluations were sponsored by OEO and were carried out by other poverty
lawyers.93 These teams spent most of their time asking DNA's staff how well
they thought they were doing. In an article on public interest lawyers in 1970,
the Yale Law Journal summed up the situation: "if the client is not paying
the lawyer, [the client] is deprived of a pecuniary sanction and a psychological
advantage.""4
2. Wall Street and Washington firms are likely to employ attorneys of the
same social class and educational background as their clients. Informal relation-
ships between big-time lawyers and their well-heeled clients are common. Martin
Mayer, author of The Lawyers, confirms this noting that corporate lawyers
"have far more personal contact with their clients than the outside world real-
izes."'' In this intimacy a client can almost always rest assured that his lawyer
will studiously avoid any action contrary to his interests.
But a legal services client is usually from a lower economic level. He is
also from a culture and ethnic group which in many cases is different from his
lawyer. Besides, he is uneducated. He cannot communicate effectively with his
lawyer. And finally, he has always had problems with people behind desks,
and is hence reluctant or unable to judge his lawyer's performance. He is, says
91 Calm & Calm, supra note 10, at 1323.
92 Cahn & Cahn, What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 NoTRE DAME
LAWYER 927 (1966).
93 OEO now claims to include representatives of clients on evaluation teams.
94 Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALe L.J. 1005, 1012 (1970).
95 M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS 308 (1970). In NLADA BRIEFCAsE, supra note 88, the
point is made that legal services lawyers serving Indians are generally very close to their clients
socially. The opposite is true in my experience. Far from having a congenial, informal rela-
tionship with most clients, DNA lawyers generally lived in government-built compounds by
themselves and affected either a BIA, split-level life-style or a hippyish, back-to-nature mode,
both quite alien to most DNA clients. NARF and Harvard lawyers, on the other hand, are
stationed so far from most of their clients that personal intimacy must be extremely rare
between them, if it exists at all.
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the Yale Law Journal, "more deferential to the lawyer and more vulnerable to
his control."96
3. Wall Street and Washington firms have no independent boards or direc-
tors vying with clients for the lawyer's attention, interest, and loyalty. NARF,
DNA, and Harvard have such boards. Although the boards seldom are in actual
control of legal operations, they do exercise influence. At the very least they act
as shields, protecting the lawyers from criticism from outside the program.
The Cahs summarize this relationship between corporate structure and
effectiveness by claiming that OEO legal programs have concentrated on the
service function to the almost total exclusion of the "capital investment" (self-
help) approach." As a result, they conclude,
Poverty lawyers, without realizing the implications of their elitism, unwit-
tingly become part of the vast bureaucracy charged with the care and tend-
ing of the poor and lacking in any accountability to the poor. In some in-
stances, legal services programs have been gravely unresponsive to major
needs, concerns and grievances of the client population-as unresponsive
as the very institutions that have been a source of injustice to the poor.98
D. An Inappropriate Model
These failures probably relate to the theoretical models on which the pro-
grams were built: the southern civil rights organizations. In 1968 the Ford
Foundation, a principal supporter of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund, decided to spawn an Indian equivalent. It sent questionnaires to all Indian
legal services programs asking for ideas and suggestions about how to organize,
finance and administer such a project.99 (Characteristically, in its "best and
brightest" tradition, the Ford Foundation directed its query to the experts, the
lawyers, and not to Indians.) The response from NARF's parent organization,
California Indian Legal Services (CILS) was considered best so it was given
an initial grant to build the program. Only after the project was basically out-
lined did CILS choose an Indian steering committee, and then the first selection
was made by CILS lawyers after a mass mailing was made soliciting candidates.
The southern civil rights programs are inappropriate models for organiza-
tions such as NARF for two reasons: (1) the differing nature of the problems
and (2) the way the programs are funded. The southern programs were con-
cerned primarily with integration, a measurable, quantifiable commodity. (You
can count the numbers of blacks in school or on a bus.) But in Indian affairs,
especially education, the issues are only peripherally legal or quantifiable. (There
is no mathematical way to calculate or measure "coercive assimilation" or the
harm it does.) Moreover, the southern programs were agreed on using lawsuits
as a fundamental strategy. In Indian education, as the Ramah and Gallup
cases demonstrate, lawsuits are seldom efficient in implementing reform.
96 79 YALE L.J., supra note 94, at 1123.
97 Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession? - The Public Interest in Public
Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005, 1012 (1970).
98 Id. at 1041.
99 For some insight into the grantmanship required for a Ford Foundation grant, see
Foster, Playing It Safe on $11 Million a Year, 3 JuRis DOCTOR 6, 9-17 (1973).
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The second way in which the two programs differ from their southern
predecessors is in the method by which they are funded. All of the funds for the
Harvard and NARF Indian Education Legal Support Project come from the
Government. Both are susceptible, therefore, to governmental pressure. The
southern programs were never forced to count on public funds. Thus, they never
had to contend with governmental influence. They were never subject to the
built-in contradiction inherent in publicly funded poverty projects: the dis-
crepancy arising from an inconceivability that the government, as Mr. Agnew
candidly concedes,'00 would keep on paying for revolution against itself.
Having ample warning of this built-in contradiction, all legal services pro-
grams, not just Harvard and NARF, should long ago have planned and carried
out a program to make the poor as self-sufficient as possible. Only such a strategy
would afford poor people a foundation for progress toward social and economic
equality after the smart OEO lawyers depart. But self-help conflicts with a
cherished belief of poverty lawyers in the efficacy of lawsuits as the best means
for social reform.'0 Try as they will, it seems Harvard and NARF lawyers have
been unable to implement the very means for helping Indians in education
which they emphasize in their own proposal.
This inability to radically alter the methods by which legal assistance is
provided seems fundamentally related to the framework in which legal services
lawyers operate. These structures, which almost uniformly keep clients from
exercising significant influence in their cases, make even well-intentioned, bright
attorneys unresponsive. The questions which result relate to the future. What
implications should be drawn from this one area of poverty law work and what
changes can be made to ensure that legal assistance for the poor and oppressed
is successful?
VI. Conclusion
Initially, given the overwhelming, undeniable failure of the War on Poverty
in general-the poor are still very much with us-the chances are that many of
the flaws in the "Indian Education Legal Support Project" can be found in
other programs. Until legal services programs are restructured to make lawyers
accountable to clients, continued abuses of the kind described in this article are
inevitable.
100 Agnew, supra note 3.
101 For a discussion of law school training and its deficiencies in terms of poverty law, see
Cahn & Cahn, supra note 97, at 1025-31. Or see C. REICH, THE GREENING or AMERICA 150-
51 (1970):
At a higher and more tragic level, one can observe the violent alienation of law
students from their prior selves. Finding themselves in law school for many possible
reasons, they discover that they are expected to become "argumentative" personali-
ties who listen to what someone else is saying only for the purpose of disagreeing,
"analytic" rather than receptive people, who dominate information rather than
respond to it; and intensely competitive and self-assertive as well. Since many of them
are not of this sort of personality before they start law school, they react initially
with anger and despair, and later with resignation as their self-alienation becomes
complete. In a very real sense they "become stupider" during law school, as the range
of their imagination is limited, their ability to respond with sensitivity and receive




The need for altering the mechanisms for providing assistance as argued
here contrasts with the views of Harvard's former director, who is quoted as
having said: "I think the way we [a public interest project] handle our guilt
feelings about the theoretical, technical nature of the constituency is by making
ourself responsive."' 02 In my view close inspection of public interest lawyers
will demonstrate that individuals can rarely "make themselves accountable";
only systems can do that.
Along with structural changes legal training and orientation in cultural
differences need to be offered to poverty lawyers. A self-help strategy requires
a radical alteration in the way poverty lawyers view themselves. As a group we
tend to be apocalyptic. Like knights on white chargers we smite evil Indian
traders, ghetto slumlords, car dealers, and bureaucrats who stand in the way of
justice as we see it. We eschew the subtle approaches and self-effacement
essential to community organizing. (The toughest thing for me at Ramah was
subordinating myself to the School Board.) We tend to confuse venting of our
spleens with venting of clients' spleens.
It is not that efforts at providing legal assistance to Indians in education
or the poor in general should be concluded; they should be channeled so as to
serve the interests and requirements of the clients as clients see them rather
than as professionals see them. Above all, resources must be put in the hands of
the poor so they can hire their own experts.
Only then can a basic paradox of legal aid come under some kind of con-
trol, a paradox stemming from the conflict between a lawyer's traditional role
as advisor, seer, and representative and the Indian (and other people's) goal
of self-determination. There is a very real antithesis between an Indian's belief
in his own power to control his life and the lawyer's historic practice of solving
problems for others.
Until professional skills are employed for the poor to enable them to run
their own lives, the inherent contradiction of experts giving aid to the poor
can never be overcome. And just so long as legal services programs remain
structured as they are will their assistance resemble the mittens knitted by little
old ladies back East for those poor Indian children out on the reservation.
102 79 YALE L.J., supra note 94, at 1129 (emphasis in oriinal).
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